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Reaping What Others Have Sown:  




Employing a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the 
Spanish economy, this study explicitly aims to characterise in detail the impact of the 
crisis on Spanish agrofood activities. In particular, we focus on the extent to which 
primary agricultural sectors are insulated from the broader macroeconomic effects of 
the crisis and consequently the limit of the agrofood sectors’ stabilising role within the 
wider economy. The results have broad implications for neighbouring Mediterranean 
EU economies given similarities in the relative size and structure of primary agriculture, 
and in the macroeconomic difficulties they face. 
Comparing with a status quo (i.e., no crisis) baseline, we estimate that the 
conditions of the crisis lead to a cumulative contraction of 10 per cent in Spanish 
agricultural activity by 2015, with concomitant reductions in real farming incomes of 
17%. Notwithstanding, in accordance with previous studies and a priori expectations, 
this contraction is notably smaller than in non-food sectors. Comparing between 
agricultural activities, those with smaller land cost shares exhibit greater supply 
responsiveness, particularly rice, raw sugar and intensive livestock sectors. Finally, the 
crisis induces greater income inequality across Spanish households, with utility from 







Reaping What Others Have Sown:  
Measuring the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Spanish Agriculture 
 
1. Introduction  
Since 2007, the global economy has been battling with the financial and economic 
consequences of the global depression precipitated by the US sub prime mortgage crisis 
in August of that year. Widely considered as the worst crisis since the 1930s, the 
ensuing downturn in consumer and investor confidence has catalysed a series of 
business closures, bank insolvencies, and stock market falls, whilst many western 
economies have been saddled with heavy national debts, unemployment and sluggish 
growth. This is particularly true in the European Union where the downturn in Euro 
zone economic activity in 2009 exceeded that of the United States, and recent macro 
projections have forecast a period of stagnant growth of just 1-2% over the 2010-2015 
period (IMF, 2010).  
In Spain, the fallout from the financial crisis has been particularly severe. A 
decade ago, Spain’s entry into the single currency led to a period of historically low 
interest rates. Consequent increases in real estate demand (some speculative), met by an 
elastic supply response owing to large influxes of cheap immigrant labour, bestowed an 
unhealthy degree of protagonism upon the Spanish construction industry which played a 
key role in leading the economy wide growth on an uninterrupted upward path for 15 
years (Eurostat, 2010). However, by 2007 the rapid real growth rises had already begun 
to lose pace and the ensuing credit run over the following 12 month period meant that 
Spain suffered the sharpest construction industry decline in Europe (Eurostat, 2008). 
Despite labour market reforms to reduce hiring and firing costs and the slackening of 
locked-in union-industry pay deals (The Economist, 2010), low skilled labourers (many 
of whom are migrants) remain jobless, with unemployment currently over 20%; the 
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highest in the euro zone. Given these structural weaknesses, it is expected that the 
recovery in Spain will be particularly sluggish in comparison with its European 
counterparts.1  
Turning to agriculture, expectation is that it will be relatively more resilient as a 
sector to the process of macro adjustment which is currently underway: a sentiment 
echoed in a report by OECD (2009). As an initial observation, lower income elasticities 
lead to greater demand stability for many agro-food purchases (vis-à-vis non food 
purchases) in times of hardship. This balancing mechanism ensures that the agrofood 
sector has a (albeit limited) stabilising influence over the broader economy, and is one 
aspect of the crisis this study sets out to quantify. Furthermore, this research examines 
the distribution impacts of the crisis across Spanish households, by estimating the 
impacts on food (and non-food) budget shares, and on real incomes. 
Another key observation is that the credit crisis hit investor expectations hard with 
the result that capital flows in Spain contracted heavily from the middle of 2007 to 
2009, significantly impacting on financial markets and construction in particular. 
Agricultural sectors are ‘relatively’ less exposed to volatility on capital markets given 
the more stable nature of food demands alluded to above. Notwithstanding, it still 
remains the case that for food industries (as in other sectors), trade credit availability 
remains “a significant problem for manufacturers, processors and producer 
cooperatives” (OECD, 2009, pp47). Thus, a third aim of the paper is to estimate the 
impact of lowered investor ‘expectations’ on food and non food activity. Finally, by 
including biofuels sectors into our analysis, we ascertain the relationship between fossil 
fuel prices, first generation biofuel demand and consequently, the potential impact (if 
any) on cereals (ethanol) and oilseeds (biodiesel) sectors. 
                                                 
1 Indeed, recent fears relating to Spain’s perceived inability to adjust to the current macro climate have 
fuelled speculation led rises in interest yields on Spanish bonds.  
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As a theoretically consistent empirical framework for modelling the economy-
wide impacts resulting from macro or commodity specific shocks, a number of authors 
have turned to the computable general equilibrium (CGE) tool to examine the crisis. In 
each case, the authors do not attempt to model the causes of the crisis, but rather play to 
the strength of the CGE modelling approach, by capturing the symptoms of the crisis as 
a vehicle for assessing its impact on commodity markets, trade and real incomes. With 
some exceptions (e.g., Raihan 2010; Ahmed et al, 2010) a common theme is the 
inclusion of investor expectations in successive time periods, which in turn lends itself 
to a dynamic CGE model treatment. 
A number of CGE dynamic studies examine the crisis from a global perspective. 
Employing a six sector 15 region dynamic CGE model, McKibbin and Stoeckel (2009) 
examine the importance of risk perception amongst businesses and households as a 
precursor for rapid recovery from the global recession. Strutt and Walmsley (2010) also 
use a dynamic variant of the well known GTAP model to compare three policy 
scenarios with a status quo baseline: a moderate crisis; a severe crisis; and a 
protectionist response to a moderate crisis. In the context of our paper, they find 
agriculture, particularly crops, is one of the least affected sectors. Moreover, unlike 
primary agriculture and food activities, the construction and manufacturing industries in 
the European Union (EU), as well as in the US and Japan, witness the largest falls in 
output due to falling investment.  
To allow for a more detailed examination of the crisis for a particular case study, 
other dynamic CGE studies employ in-house single country models. Focusing on South-
Africa, Chitiga (2010) examines three different aspects of the crisis: reductions in 
export demand; world price falls; and a collapse in foreign direct investment. 
Classifying their 37 sectors into those which are ‘unaffected’, ‘weakly affected’, ‘mildly 
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affected’ and ‘strongly affected’, ‘agriculture and forestry’ and ‘food’ are typically 
located in the first two groups. 
In this paper we construct a single country dynamic CGE model of Spain to assess 
the medium term impacts of the crisis on a detailed breakdown of agricultural sectors. 
In the context of its structural rigidities alluded to above, the focus on Spain is justified 
by weaker expectations of its ability to recover quickly in comparison with other EU 
partners.2 Taking 2008 as our point of departure, we take an anachronistic approach by 
comparing a ‘crisis-free’ baseline based on pre-crisis macro projections and modelling 
assumptions, with a crisis scenario. An important feature of this study is that it follows a 
recent paper by Dixon and Rimmer (2010)3, which captures the observed tendency for 
industries to hold excess capital capacity in times of recession. The typical (and 
simplistic) ‘full-capacity’ utilisation assumption of CGE models (i.e., no idling of 
capital) implies an unrealistically high reduction in rental rates when demand falls and a 
new market clearing equilibrium is found. By modelling excess capacity, there is sticky 
adjustment downwards in rental rates as capital stocks are left unemployed.4 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the 
methodology deployed, the model framework and the scenario design. Section 3 
presents the results of our study and in section 4 we offer some concluding comments.   
2. Methodology 
2.1 Model Database  
This study employs a heavily modified version of the ‘standard’ single country 
ORANI computable general equilibrium (CGE) model template, developed by the 
Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS) at Monash University in Australia (Horridge, 2003). 
                                                 
2 Spain has been grouped into the collective of ‘problem’ EU economies designated by the acronym 
“PIGS” (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain). 
3 Dixon and Rimmer employ a single country dynamic CGE model (USAGE) to examine the impacts of 
the stimulus package on the US economy. 
4 A further perceived advantage of this approach is that the price level does not fall quite as dramatically 
resulting in unrealistic surges in exports. 
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To support our construction of the Spanish database, the 2005 Input-Output (IO) tables 
published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) are a principle source of 
secondary data. The IO data provide tables at basic prices (prior to indirect taxes and 
transport/retail margins) and purchaser’s prices (inclusive of taxes and margins) for 118 
commodities and 75 industries as well as final demands. Moreover, IO tables are 
subdivided between domestic and imported activities in Spain across all intermediate 
and final demand accounts. Importantly, the conditions imposed by the IO table 
(demands equal supplies; output equals expenditure equals income) underlie the 
fundamental accounting conventions of the CGE model framework. 
To construct a consistent CGE model database, the IO data in concert with 
additional secondary data sources are required to perform the necessary series of 
arduous steps.5 For the purposes of this study, a 41 commodity by 38 industry 
aggregation is employed with a focus on primary agriculture and food processing 
activities. Given the linkage between first generation biofuels and crop production, 
fossil fuel and biofuel (‘bioethanol’ and ‘biodiesel’) sectors are also disaggregated.6 The 
remaining sectors consist of construction activities, manufacturing and services. The 
model has three broad factors (capital, labour and agricultural land), whilst labour is 
split into “highly skilled”, “skilled”, “unskilled”, and armed forces, while household 
purchases are disaggregated into eight income groups based on monthly disposable 
income. 
2.2 Model framework 
The standard CGE framework is a ‘demand’ led model, based on a system of 
neoclassical final, intermediate and primary demand functions. With the assumption of 
weak homothetic separability, a multi-stage optimisation procedure allows demand 
                                                 
5 For the interested reader, full details of the database construction can be provided on request. 
6 First generation bioethanol is based on cereals feed, whilst biodiesel principally employs oilseeds 
(rapeseed). To the best of our knowledge, sugar beet ethanol is not currently produced in Spain.   
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decisions to be broken into ‘nests’ to provide greater flexibility through the 
incorporation of differing elasticities of substitution. Moreover, accounting identities 
and market clearing equations ensure a general equilibrium solution for each year that 
the model is run. After appropriate elasticity values are chosen to permit model 
calibration to the database, and an appropriate split of endogenous-exogenous variables 
is selected (closure), specific exogenous macroeconomic or trade policy ‘shocks’ can be 
imposed to key variables (e.g., tax/subsidy rates, primary factor supplies, technical 
change variables, or real growth in GDP and/or its components). The model responds 
with the interaction of economic agents within each market, where an outcome is 
characterised by a ‘counterfactual’ set of equilibrium conditions.  
Given the importance of investor expectations, we attempt to capture the main 
symptoms of the crisis on the Spanish economy.7 To incorporate excess capacity in the 





















t       (1) 
Thus, the capital rental rate in the policy (crisis) scenario in period t, ( PtR ), relative to 
the rental rate in the base (no crisis) scenario in period t, ( BtR ), is a positive function of 
the corresponding ratio in period t-1 and a negative function of excess capital capacity 
(U), measured by the ratio of capital in use to capital in existence (i.e., U ≤1). In the 
crisis years, the excess capacity term on the right hand side of (1) is activated by a 
closure swap. 
The ratio of investment to capital (i.e., capital accumulation) is characterised by 
the following logistic function (Dixon and Rimmer, 2007): 
                                                 
7 Given the lack of any detailed financial sector (in common with other CGE studies), we do not set out to 
model in detail the drivers of the crisis, but rather capture the symptoms of the crisis for the purposes of 
fulfilling our principle research objective (i.e., measure the concomitant impacts on Spanish agrofood 
sectors). 
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)1/(.  MQUMGQG trend       (2) 
Capital stock accumulation by industry (G)8 is a positive function of the ratio of 
‘expected’ to ‘normal’ rates of return (M). Thus, if the expected rate of return exceeds 
(falls below) the economy-wide ‘normal’ rate of return then the investment/capital ratio 
will exceed (fall below) its trend (Gtrend). Other things equal, the change in G with 
respect to changes in the ratio M is governed by the investment elasticity . Following 
Dixon and Rimmer (2010), the impacts of new investment on capital growth rates are 
moderated when there is excess capital stock in the crisis years (i.e., U < 1). The 
parameter Q captures the ceiling on the investment/capital ratio as a multiple of the 
trend ratio. 
In our model closure, changes in investor expectations are calibrated to exogenous 
(historical and projected) shocks on macro investment changes (see later). Expected 
rates of return in period t (Et) are a weighted average of expected rates of return in 
period t-1 (Et-1) and actual rates of return in period t (Rt).9    
  DUxRExUE ttt ).1()1(. 1         (3) 
Furthermore, following Dixon and Rimmer (2010), in the crisis years, the expected rates 
of return are lowered by the emergence of excess capacity. Thus, in the crisis years, the 
rate of return on idle capital is also a negative function of the depreciation rate (i.e., that 
proportion of capital not in use accrues no return and deteriorates at the rate of 
depreciation).  
A further defining characteristic of the Spanish economy has been the severity of 
its unemployment. In this study, we implicitly capture unemployment via exogenous 
shocks on aggregate employment and population according to historical data (Eurostat, 
2010) and projections (European Commission, 2009). As a corollary of the investment 
                                                 
8 Also known as the change in the investment/capital ratio in the model. 
9 The larger is the parameter ‘x’ in equation (3), the faster is the convergence of expected rates to actual 
rates of return. 
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module, actual employment rates (L) are compared with trend employment rates (T) in 
order to determine changes in the real wage rate (W): 
)/(]1)/[(/ 000 TLTLWW        (4) 
Equation (4) states that the change in the real wage ( 0/WW ) is the total derivative of 
changes in the ratio of employment to an exogenous trend rate (or natural long run 
rate) )/( 00 TL  and the wage elasticity (). In our model, to capture the sticky nature of 
real wages to employment levels (particularly given the strong presence of trade unions 
in Spain) we carefully examine the impacts of exogenous employment rate (L) shocks 
on real wages and compare with historical data on (‘sticky’) real wage changes for the 
Spanish economy (INE, 2010). This technique was employed to calibrate the wage 
elasticity parameter.  
In addition, Labour Force Survey data (INE, 2010) allow for a disaggregation of 
labour by occupation. In Spain, there is a heavy degree of regulation and barriers to 
entry in the labour market (particularly amongst higher skilled occupations) which 
implies supply rigidity. Consequently, labour supply functions are introduced, where 
owing to the dearth of relevant estimates, it is assumed that high skilled occupations 
have a labour supply elasticity which is one-tenth of the central estimates employed in 
this study (see below). 
The representation of energy demands follows the nesting structure of the GTAP-
E model (Burniaux and Troung, 2002), where separate energy nests allow for a more 
flexible representation of substitution possibilities between differing energy types (e.g., 
electricity, coal, petroleum, biofuels), particularly the blending possibilities between 
biofuels and petroleum products in transport. In the standard Spanish IO database there 
is no explicit recognition of biofuel activity, whilst recent experience suggests that these 
sectors will continue to have added significance to agricultural activity in the medium 
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run. Employing the SPLITCOM facility in GEMPACK (Horridge, 2005), first-
generation biofuels sectors are disaggregated from existing industries. Cost share data10 
for bioethanol and biodiesel are taken from Bamiere et al (2007) and the Ministerio de 
Industria, Comercio y Turismo, (2005), whilst Spanish data from APPA (2009) are 
employed to estimate biofuel domestic household demands, exports and imports. 
In the context of our study aims, additional code is implemented to support the 
representation of the CAP. In the model data, coupled support payments by agricultural 
sector are characterised as subsidies on land (e.g., set-aside and area payments) capital 
(e.g., headage premia on livestock, investment aids), production (e.g., production aids, 
stock purchases) and intermediate input subsidies (seed payments, irrigation aids, 
distribution and marketing payments, etc.). Given the policy evolution of the CAP, 
sector specific payments are gradually decoupled year on year (see section 2.3) and 
reconstituted as a Single Farm Payment (SFP), which is introduced as a uniform subsidy 
rate on the land factor (Frandsen et al., 2003). Intervention prices are modelled as 
changes to trade protection whilst pillar II modulation payments are implemented year 
on year as a direct payment to the ‘agricultural farm household’, which collects all 
agricultural policy payments and returns on agricultural value added. Employing 
complementarity step functions (Elbehri and Pearson, 2005), production quotas are 
modelled for raw sugar and milk (Lips and Rieder, 2005), as well as Uruguay Round 
constraints on export quantities and subsidy expenditure. Set aside is characterised 
employing a technical change variable on the land factor (Frandsen and Jensen, 2000).  
In agricultural factor markets, capital and labour move sluggishly between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors to capture rental and wage differentials 
between sub-sectors (Keeney and Hertel, 2005). The movement of heterogeneous land 
types between agricultural sectors is governed by a three nested elasticity of 
                                                 
10 Characterised as ‘capital’, ‘labour’, ‘feedstocks’, ‘chemicals’, ‘energy’, ‘other inputs’. 
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transformation function (OECD, 2003). Finally, to explore the distributive effects of 
policy changes, Household Survey Data (INE, 2009) permit a disaggregation of private 
household purchases for up to eight distinct disposable income groupings  
Given the lack of relevant Spanish data sources, calibration is facilitated through 
usage of substitution and expenditure elasticities from the standard GTAP version 7.1 
database (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008). In the energy module, substitution 
elasticities from GTAP-E econometric estimates for developed countries are employed. 
Export demand elasticities are borrowed from the Australian ORANI database, whilst 
the transformation elasticities for land (between uses); and capital and labour (between 
agricultural/non-agricultural uses) are taken from Keeney and Hertel (2005). Central 
tendency estimates of labour supply elasticities for Spain are taken from Fernándes-Val 
(2003) whilst for agro-food products, private household expenditure elasticities are 
taken from a study by Moro and Sckokai (2000) on Italian households stratified by 
wealth.  
2.3 Scenario Design 
A key determinant of the results is the choice of macro closure and background 
shocks employed. The study implements year on year shocks for two alternate realities 
over a ten year period (2005-2015). The baseline contemplates a ‘non-crisis’ time 
frame, which is subsequently compared with a policy scenario which captures the crisis. 
It is assumed that the point of departure for the two scenarios is 2008. From a cursory 
review of older economic projections, it becomes apparent that the crisis was largely 
unforeseen. Consequently, to characterise the baseline scenario we employ, where 
possible, Spanish macro estimates from reports prior to the crisis (circa 2008) coupled 
with our own calculations. In the case of the policy (crisis) scenario, there is a greater 
dependence on secondary data projections. Details of the magnitudes and data sources 
for all years relating to each exogenous macro variable are presented in Table 1. With 
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shocks to public expenditure we capture the fiscal stimulus that took place in the crisis 
years as well as the ‘austerity measures’ that followed, whilst exogenous shocks on 
aggregate investment are designed to capture the downturn in investor expectations, 
which had such a detrimental impact on the (inter alia) construction industry. 
In addition to the annual macro changes, further exogenous shocks (Table 2) are 
imposed on world prices11 and trade for fossil fuels; agrofood exports in 2006-7; biofuel 
consumption, trade and production trends; consumer taste changes toward red meats; 
and total factor productivity for all sectors. Finally, exogenous changes in CAP policy 
are detailed in Table 3. Second pillar support (Axis 1, 2 and 3) is not modelled because 
its allocation is largely based on political considerations which are beyond the scope of 
the model. Notwithstanding, modulation of funds from Pillar I to Pillar II are 
implemented into the farm household income function as a direct payment. Since these 
are merely reported as summary statistics, this category of Pillar II payments does not 
impact on market activity and consequently, factor returns in agriculture.  
3. Results: Crisis Scenario vs. Baseline Scenario. 
In the following sections results are grouped into macro effects; sectoral 
impacts; trade; and household utility and farm incomes. Unless otherwise stated, 
estimates are presented as cumulative differences to 2015 with respect to the no crisis 
baseline.12 
3.1. Macro Impacts 
 Examining Figure 1, an initial observation is that by 2015 the Spanish economy 
remains below its no crisis baseline path for all macro variables (except net trade – see 
section 3.3). The implication from our exogenous macro estimates (Table 1) is that the 
                                                 
11 It is assumed that the slump in fossil fuel prices which occurred in 2009 following the peaks of 2008, 
does not occur in the baseline. There we follow an OECD assumption of 2% growth a year. In subsequent 
years, there is a degree of price convergence in fossil fuel prices between the baseline and the crisis 
scenarios. 
12 Consequently, reported “falls” may sometimes be interpreted as relatively smaller increases in the 
policy scenario (relative to the baseline) of the economic variable being discussed. 
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crisis is expected to have a long term effect on macro readjustment as Spain implements 
its fiscal retrenchment programs under conditions of sluggish economic growth. As 
expected, the largest decline occurs in the period 2009-2011. 
The initial impact of the crisis was witnessed in the investment markets, where 
concomitant downturns in investor confidence are estimated to reduce investment by 
29% by 2011 and 35% by 2015 (Figure 1). In Spain, this initial impact manifested itself 
most prominently in the housing market, which hitherto constituted an important driver 
of economic growth. In Table 4, real net investment in construction and real estate is 
estimated to fall 32% by 2009 (compared with 18% for the economy), and is 
approximately half its baseline level by 2015. As a result, there are concomitant 
reductions in construction and real estate output of 14% in 2009, rising to 30% by 
2015.13 With contractions in construction activity, the rate of return on capital14 also 
falls more noticeably in construction compared with the rest of the economy (Table 4). 
Returning to Figure 1, aggregate government spending exceeds the baseline by 
8% in 2009 owing to the fiscal stimulus package, which by 2015 falls back to 20% 
below the baseline as austerity measures are phased in. Interestingly, the cumulative 
improvement in the trade balance by 36% (€34bn – Table 7) reflects the sharper 
reduction in Spanish imports as Spain’s economy readjusts. Relative to the baseline, 
private consumption and employment have also fallen by 13% and 15% respectively by 
2010,. By 2015, the rate of decline has slowed, although employment, a key economic 
and political gauge in Spain at the current time, is estimated to have fallen by 23% 
compared with the baseline. Retail prices and real growth fall by 10% and 27% 
                                                 
13 This statistic is estimated under our assumption of ‘excess capacity’. That is, additional purchases of 
capital do not reduce as dramatically (since some is assumed to be left idle), with the result that capital 
rental rates are sticky downward compared with a standard CGE model treatment. 
14 The rate of return is calculated as the per unit ratio of capital rents to capital good construction costs 
(price of net investment). 
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respectively, compared with 2015. Expressed another way, we estimate that the value of 
Spanish GDP is €565 billion lower in 2015 compared with the baseline scenario. 
3.2. Sectoral impacts in Spain. 
3.2.1 Agrofood vs. non food sectors  
 Examining our estimates in Table 5, falls in output are more moderate in the 
agrofood sector compared with the rest of the economy. For example, relative to the 
baseline, primary agricultural and food processing outputs fall 10% and 15%, 
respectively. These statistics compare with the Spanish average statistic of -23%, 
suggesting that the agrofood sector is fulfilling (to an extent) the stabilising role referred 
to in the introduction. Indeed, by 2015, the share of agrofood activity in overall GDP is 
greater in the crisis scenario (6.4%) than in the baseline (5.7%). There are various 
factors that help explain this observation. 
Firstly, agrofood commodities have lower income elasticities of demand than 
non-agrofood commodities, particularly ‘staple’ primary agricultural commodities. 
Consequently, with falling real incomes in Spain, the impact of leftward shifts in the 
demand curve are moderated considerably. Secondly, as land is modelled as a relatively 
sluggish factor (compared with labour and capital), agricultural supply responsiveness 
(and to a lesser extent, food) is greatly reduced. Accordingly, the effect of the crisis in 
these sectors is manifested relatively more through price reductions than declines in 
output (this issue will be explored in greater detail in section 3.2.2 below). 
Thirdly, the importance of investment markets to construction and real estate is 
also of significance to the Spanish economy as a whole. Column 1 of Table 5 shows that 
39% of construction and real estate sales are in the form of investment demand. In 
contrast, relatively little agricultural and food produce is investment dependent.15 In the 
                                                 
15 These statistics are based on the underlying data from the input-output table for Spain in 2005. 
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context of the discussion above relating to the collapse in investment, it follows that 
agro-food sectors are relatively insulated from the downturn in expectations.  
A secondary impact of the crisis is that relatively larger cumulative contractions 
in manufacturing (-29%) and construction (-30%) release larger quantities of labour and 
capital (Table 5). Real wages and capital rents and employment fall across all sectors in 
the economy (Table 5), but the falls are generally smaller in the agrofood sector as these 
industries take advantage of the resources released by the larger, but shrinking, 
industries in the non-agrofood sector. That said, employing input-output data on full 
time equivalent jobs in agriculture, in the year 2015, primary agriculture is still 
operating with 120,000 fewer workers. 
3.2.2 Individual primary agricultural and food sectors 
As a ‘sluggish’ factor of production,16 it is expected (ceteris paribus) that those 
agricultural sectors which have relatively larger (smaller) land cost shares are less 
(more) supply responsive. With some notable exceptions (e.g., fruit and vegetables17) 
primary agricultural demands are derived from (income inelastic) downstream food 
demands. For example, raw milk and sugar consumption is a function of dairy and sugar 
processing industry demand. A final consideration is the relationship between real 
investment falls and capital availability. The strength of this relationship is a function of 
the capital intensivity of each agricultural industry.18  
In the cereals and oilseeds sectors, price falls are more exaggerated whilst output 
falls are small. This is partly because of the low demand elasticity with respect to 
expenditure for staples, whilst the supply curve is also inelastic due to the large land 
                                                 
16 The elasticity of transformation on land between similar activities (e.g. wheat and barley) is greater 
than that between more ‘varied’ activities (e.g. wheat and raw milk) (see section 2.2). 
17 Vegetables and fruit constitute approximately 20% and 15%, respectively, of primary agricultural 
output in Spain. 
18 Note that land, capital and labour cost shares for Spanish agricultural sectors are based on both cost 
estimates in RECAN (2008) and the anuario de estadisticas (MARM, 2006) which give land prices and 
hectare usage by crops types. 
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cost shares in these sectors. The market for wheat is particularly inelastic with output 
falls of only 7% compared with the baseline (see Table 6).  
With its larger land cost share, fruit faces a steeper supply curve than vegetables, 
which is reflected in the results when comparing the relative magnitudes of price and 
output changes for these two large sectors (Table 6). Interestingly, both sectors are 
export orientated, with overseas markets accounting for approximately half of all 
Spanish vegetable sales, and more than half of all Spanish fruit sales. With its relatively 
smaller output decline and larger sectoral terms of trade fall, fruit exports do not suffer 
quite as much as vegetable exports (for further discussion see section 3.3).  
Raw sugar quotas remain non-binding throughout both baseline and crisis 
scenarios, whilst with its relatively small land cost share, the crisis induced impact on 
output is notable (-18%),19 with accompanying moderate price falls (5%). In the 
relatively capital intensive livestock sectors (pigs, poultry, raw milk) crisis induced 
output falls are also elastic (smaller land cost shares) and poor investor expectations 
impact more on capital uptake in these sectors. Moreover, with greater dependence on 
high concentrate feed inputs whose price falls only 4% compared with the baseline (not 
shown), poultry and pig price falls are moderated. With gradual exogenous increases in 
the milk quota, rents disappear in the crisis scenario as the quota becomes non-binding 
prior to its elimination in 2015. In extensive livestock sectors (cattle, sheep and goats), 
with greater usage of pasture, supply elasticities are (a priori) moderated. With 
reductions in tastes and preferences for red meats coupled with falling disposable 
incomes, price falls for sheep and goats are estimated at 16% compared with the 
baseline, with a cumulative output fall of 10% by 2015. In the cattle sector, the value 
added share of production is smaller, where animal feed (intermediate input) shares play 
                                                 
19 The sugar beet sector in Spain is small. Thus, our output statistic is taken from a small base. 
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a larger role. Thus, despite taste changes in favour of white meats, relatively stable feed 
prices mitigate the price falls that would otherwise occur in this sector.  
In our crisis scenario, world prices of fossil fuels (particularly oil and natural 
gas) fall from their peaks in 2008, while in the baseline, it is assumed that these prices 
are more or less sustained over the simulation period. This assumption has implications 
across the economy, but the effects are particularly marked in the nascent biofuels 
industries. By 2011, biodiesel output has contracted 52% compared with the baseline 
(although still an increase of 84% on 2005) while the corresponding statistic for 
bioethanol is a reduction of 21%. By 2015, biodiesel and bioethanol production 
recovers to 31% and 15% lower, respectively (Table 6), as the projected oil price begins 
to converge with the baseline. As an important feed input into the biodiesel industry, the 
biodiesel share of Spanish oilseed (rapeseed) sales is approximately 13% in 2005, 
compared with approximately 20% by 2015 in the crisis scenario. By 2011, Spanish 
oilseed production is 6% lower, of which it is estimated that one-third is due to the 
relative contraction in the biodiesel industry. That the effect is not more noticeable is 
because much of the demand reduction for biodiesel is soaked up by falls in extra-EU 
biodiesel imports (principally from the USA). Although Spanish bioethanol employs 
cereals as key feedstocks, the usage of these inputs as a proportion of total cereal sales 
is moderate, such that Spanish bioethanol market trends are not found to impact on 
Spanish cereals prices and outputs.  
3.3. Trade Balances 
According to our estimates, Spain’s trade balance witnesses a relative 
cumulative improvement of €34billion by 2015 compared with the baseline (Table 7), 
reflecting the large drop in imports in response to falling national incomes. 
Notwithstanding, as the crisis reduces the size of Spain’s economy by around half a 
trillion euros over the simulation period, the trade deficit as a proportion of GDP 
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actually worsens relative to the baseline. More specifically, Spain’s trade deficit is 9.1% 
of GDP in 2005, compared with 13.4% in 2015 in the baseline and 17.0% in 2015 in the 
crisis scenario.  
In the agro-food sectors, in comparison with the baseline, cumulative trade 
balances generally improve, most notably for wheat (€211 million), maize (€215 
million), oilseeds (€229 million), red meat (€249 million), dairy (€483 million) and 
sugar (€641 million) (Table 7). However, the cumulative trade balance statistic for the 
aggregate primary agricultural and processed food sectors shows a deterioration of -
€758million and -€1,090 million, respectively. In primary agriculture, the result is 
dominated by deteriorations in vegetables (-€1,377 million) and fruit (-€797 million). In 
Spain, both sectors are heavily export orientated, where the export share of total sales is 
considerable (40% and 60% for vegetables and fruit, respectively). Consequently, 
output reductions in these sectors impact heavily on exports. In the food processing 
sectors, large trade balance deteriorations occur for alcoholic beverages (-€875 million), 
white meat (mainly pork) (-€513 million) and oils and fats (-€831 million). As with fruit 
and vegetables, the trade balance deteriorations are due to the export orientated nature 
of these sectors.  
3.4. Utility and Farm Household Incomes  
Overall, cumulative utility (real income) per household from the crisis falls by 
19.2% (an economy wide fall of €103,820 million) in 2015 compared with the baseline. 
Further examination of the table shows that income inequality widens as per household 
utility falls are more severe in the poorer household groupings.20 Since poorer 
households have a higher elasticity of marginal utility with respect to changes in 
                                                 
20 The discrete income groupings are defined by the National Statistics Institute of Spain (INE, 2010). 
 20
expenditure, their utility is hit harder in the crisis scenario.21 Thus, in Table 8 the 
poorest households witness real income reductions of 28% (€2,366 million) compared 
with only 12% (€4,266 million) for the wealthiest. Consistent with Engel’s Law,22 
falling average real incomes result in a change in the composition of food/non-food 
purchases. Thus, from a food budget share base of 21% in 2005, by 2015 ‘poor’ 
household food budget shares rise to 23% in the crisis scenario, compared with a fall to 
20% in the baseline (not shown). In contrast, food budget shares in the wealthiest group 
stay more or less fixed at 2005 levels (10%) in the crisis scenario, compared with a 
slight fall in the baseline (to 9%). With a larger food budget share, food utility losses are 
larger in the poorer households. A cursory view of Table 8 shows that the decline in 
food utility in the poorest households is 11%, compared with only 1% for the richest 
households. Finally, comparing food and non food utility reductions, Table 8 reveals 
that the latter is larger; in part because the non food budget share (weighting) is greater; 
but also owing to the larger fall in nominal food prices, resulting in a smaller negative 
real income effect on food purchases. 
In Figure 2 we estimate the impact of the crisis on farm incomes relative to the 
baseline. Overall, the crisis causes real farm incomes to fall by 17% by 2015, 
principally owing to a decline in real factor returns of 22%, whilst net off-farm receipts 
rise owing to the contraction in tax payments paid by farmers on their reduced output.23 
The point of inflection in 2011 is due to the large build up of capital accumulation 
which occurs in the baseline (not present in the crisis scenario), resulting in capital 
                                                 
21 In the linear expenditure system (LES) function, this elasticity is calibrated to the Frisch (1959) 
parameter, which can also be interpreted as the ratio of total income to luxury goods expenditure. The 
higher is the absolute value of the parameter, the poorer is the household. 
22 In dynamic CGE models, the marginal budget shares in the LES private household function are updated 
at the end of each year. Thus, over time, Engel curves are not restricted to be straight lines from the 
origin. 
23 It is assumed that agricultural support payments are more or less stable in both scenarios since the 
allocations are pre-agreed as part of the EU’s budgetary framework agreement. 
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rental falls which dents (agricultural) factor incomes from capital. After 2011, this effect 
reverts to its long term trend as the capital market corrects itself. 
4. Conclusions 
From its origins in late 2007, many countries in the West are still recovering 
from the legacy of the financial crisis, regarded as the largest global downturn since the 
1930s, and the European Union has suffered more than most other regions. Of the larger 
EU economies, Spain was the last to emerge with positive growth figures. In common 
with its euro zone neighbours, Greece and Portugal, it has a relatively high national debt 
as a proportion of GDP and rigid labour markets, whilst its unemployment rate is 
approximately double the EU average. In addition, like Ireland (and to a lesser extent, 
the UK), falling property prices have weakened domestic demand considerably.   
In cumulative terms compared with the status quo (i.e. no crisis) baseline, by 
2015 primary agricultural output falls by 10%, employs 120,000 fewer workers and 
faces real farm income reductions of 17%. Behind these headline figures, the 
contraction in Spanish agriculture and food industries is relatively less than the non food 
sectors, resulting in a larger agrofood proportion of Spanish GDP in the crisis scenario  
(6.4%) compared with the baseline (5.7%); a result which supports a priori expectations 
(OECD, 2009) and previous literature (e.g., McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009; Chitiga, 
2010). This finding is attributed to more inelastic supply in agriculture, lower income 
elasticities of demand for food products, and the reduced relative importance of investor 
expectations compared with manufacturing and construction. Further examination 
reveals that with greater supply inelasticity in primary agriculture (owing to the 
presence of agricultural land), crisis induced agricultural market price falls exceed those 
of the non food sectors. 
Comparing between agricultural sectors, supply responsiveness depends broadly 
on the cost share of the land factor, the size of the derived demand shift from real 
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income falls and the relative loss in capital availability from poorer investor 
expectations. Consequently, intensive livestock sectors (poultry, raw milk, pigs), sugar 
and rice exhibit greater supply responsiveness (reductions) than, for example, cereals, 
oilseeds and extensive livestock activities. On the relation between first generation 
biofuels and feed crops, with its relatively small cereals sales share, there is little 
evidence to suggest that bioethanol contractions have much impact on cereals demand. 
On the other hand, crisis induced output contractions in first generation biodiesel 
production are estimated to account for one-third of the reduction in oilseeds 
production. Turning to Spain’s trade, the deterioration in the agricultural trade balance 
(-€758 million) is driven by worsening conditions in the two large export orientated 
sectors of fruit (-€797 million) and vegetables (-€1,377 million), but mitigated by 
modest improvements elsewhere (see Table 7). 
Finally, an examination of household expenditures suggests that there is a 
worrying increase in income inequality in Spain resulting from the crisis. In terms of 
food demands, budget shares for poorer households rise in accordance with Engel’s 
Law, whilst cumulative reductions in ‘food utility’ are 11% in the poorest households, 
compared with 1% in the wealthiest. 
As a caveat to the analysis, the credibility of the results can principally be 
judged on the quality of the underlying CGE data flows, elasticities and macro shocks. 
With some unknowns regarding projections shocks, particularly in the baseline, 
plausible ‘trend’ assumptions have been applied employing time series data. Against 
this background, an underlying hypothesis of our macro projections is that the Spanish 
economy under the crisis remains some way below its baseline trajectory in 2015. 
Implicitly we postulate, based on official forecasts supported by current structural (e.g., 
unemployment, competitiveness) and financial indicators (e.g., national debt, house 
prices), that recovery for the Spanish economy is going to be slow, although not 
 23
unprecedented (e.g., Japan’s ‘lost decade’). In this context, our model results should be 
considered as lower bound estimates.  
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Baseline Annual Projections Shocks (%) 
 Historical Data Shocks Projections Shocks 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Real GDP 4.75 4.11 1.07 1.55 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 
Real Consumption 3.98 4.10 0.99 1.43 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02
Real Investment 10.27 4.26 2.54 3.68 7.78 7.78 7.78 7.78 7.78 7.78 
Real Public Expenditure 4.87 6.14 1.25 1.81 3.83 3.83 3.83 3.83 3.83 3.83 
Real Exports 4.89 4.66 1.58 1.96 3.93 3.93 3.93 3.93 3.93 3.93
Employment 4.08 3.08 1.19 1.72 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65 
Sources: 
Historical data: GDP, consumption, investment, exports & employment from Eurostat (2010); Public expenditure from INE (2010) 
Projections data: GDP from IMF (2008);  consumption, investment, exports & employment from own calculations24
Crisis Annual Projections Shocks (%) 
 Historical Data Shocks Projections Shocks 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Real GDP 4.75 4.11 -0.73 -3.17 -1.19 0.60 0.75 1.73 1.94 2.35 
Real Consumption 3.98 4.10 -5.38 -1.28 1.51 2.20 1.97 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Real Investment 10.27 4.26 -17.60 -10.50 -1.97 3.10 4.57 5.20 5.58 6.60 
Real Public Expenditure 4.87 6.14 5.58 0.02 -1.39 -2.20 -2.73 -0.50 1.50 2.50 
Real Exports 4.89 4.66 -14.20 1.62 4.21 5.80 6.07 5.84 5.62 5.30 
Employment 4.08 3.08 -6.76 -1.90 0.70 1.90 2.30 2.30 2.70 3.00 
Sources: 
Historical data: As baseline, but applied up to 2008. 
Projections data: GDP from IMF (2010);  investment from Eurostat (2010) and European Commission (2010); consumption, exports, employment and public expenditure 
from European Commission (2010) 




                                                 
24 Time series data from 1995-2007 was used to estimate an elasticity for the relevant variable with respect to real GDP. This was then used in conjunction with real GDP 
projections, to calculate projections for that variable. 
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Shocked Variables Baseline Scenario Crisis Scenario 
World prices of fossil Fuels (oil. coal. crude gas) IMF (2010) for 2006-
2008. 2009 onwards 
assumed 2% annual 
increases (as OECD 
2009 projections). 
IMF (2010) 
World prices of biofuels (bioethanol & biodiesel) OECD (2010) OECD (2010) slow 
recovery estimates 
Imports (Fossil Fuels) &  Exports (Fossil Fuels 
and Agrofood) 
Datacomex (2010) 
Biofuels  (domestic sales,  production & trade) 2006-8. APPA Biocarburantes (2009)  
2009 onwards. Endogenous 
Total factor productivity shocks Taken from Ludena et al. (2006) and Jensen & 
Frandsen (2003) 
Red/white meat taste changes OECD (2008) 




Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Shocks 
 Introduction of the Single Farm Payment – year on year shocks (2006-2015) taken from historical data 
(FEGA, 2010). Complete decoupling of agricultural payments by 2015. 
 Modulation implemented based on historical data (FEGA, 2010). Modulation projections assumed to rise to 
3% by 2015. Given the structure of the agricultural industry in Spain and the small farms exemption, 
historical data reveals that Spain’s modulation rate is below the EU policy prescribed rate (1% a year from 
4% in 2006 to 10% in 2012) (FEGA, 2010). Consequently, we assume that the modulation rate rises to 
3% by 2015. Pillar II Modulation payments transferred to farm household income function. 
 One-off sugar quota reduction (2006). No further cuts are necessary due to the sizeable ‘voluntary’ cuts in 
production resulting from intervention price reductions. 
 Dairy (2006-2008) and sugar (2006-2010) intervention price reductions. 
 Export subsidy changes based on historical data (2006-2009) (FEGA, 2010) 
 6.5% tariff on biodiesel implemented from 2005/6 onwards (APPA, 2009). 33% weighted tariff on 
Bioethanol implemented from 2005/6 onwards (APPA, 2009). 
 2% increase in EU wide milk quota sanctioned by the EU (April 2008). Year on year 1% increases (2009-
2014). Abolition 2015. 
 Abolition of set-aside (2009) 









 2008 2009 2010 2011 2015 
Capital Rental Rate:      
     Construction and real estate -4 -20 -24 -25 -22 
     Economy -2 -10 -15 -18 -24 
      
Per Unit Cost of Net Investment:      
     Construction and real estate 0 -5 -6 -7 -6 
     Economy 0 -4 -5 -6 -7 
      
Capital Employed:      
     Construction and real estate 0 -1 -3 -6 -21 
     Economy 0 -1 -2 -3 -12 
      
Real Net Investment:      
     Construction and real estate -8 -32 -50 -54 -47 
     Economy -6 -18 -24 -29 -35 
      
Output:      
     Construction and real estate -4 -14 -19 -23 -30 
     Economy -2 -10 -16 -20 -24 
Table 4: Investment and Capital Effects 















All Sectors 11 -8 -23 -8 -23 -22 -12 
Agriculture 1 -11 -10 -6 -12 -19 -9 
Food 0 -8 -15 -8 -15 -21 -8 
Non Agrofood 12 -8 -24 -8 -23 -21 -12 
Specific Non-Agrofood Sectors: 
    Services 8 -11 -18 -8 -19 -22 -7 
    Manufacturing 6 -8 -29 -8 -31 -25 -17 
    Constr. & real estate 39 -13 -30 -8 -29 -17 -22 
Table 5: Cumulative Outcomes by 2015 for Some Selected Industries  









    
Effect of Crisis 
on Price by 2015 
(%) 
Effect of Crisis on 
Output by 2015 
(%) 
Wheat -12 -7 
Barley -10 -9 
Maize -10 -9 
Rice -8 -11 
Other Cereals -12 -9 
Oilseeds -18 -6
Vegetables -11 -16 
Fruit -13 -12
Sugar -5 -18 
Other Crops -9 -10 
Cattle -9 -9 
Pigs -9 -12 
Sheep and Goats -16 -10 
Poultry and Eggs -10 -13 
Raw Milk -9 -11 
Biodiesel -10 -31 
Bioethanol -13 -15 
Table 6: Effect of the Crisis on Prices and Output 
 
 
(€ millions) Trade Balance  Cumulative Impact on Trade Balance vs. Baseline 
 2007  2008 2009 2010 2011 2015 
Wheat -445 -2 51 75 103 211 
Maize -716 5 57 88 119 215 
Other Cereals -144 0 10 15 22 48 
Oilseeds -2,086 13 102 136 168 229 
Fruit 3,139 -31 -366 -478 -601 -797 
Vegetables 3,198 -49 -616 -881 -1,103 -1,377 
Livestock -335 0 44 61 44 103 
Red Meat -36 -30 -37 -38 -45 249 
White Meat 1,715 -83 -370 -401 -838 -513 
Dairy -1,532 -40 -15 34 90 483 
Oils & Fats 1,126 -67 -549 -689 -796 -831 
Sugar -1,613 -10 126 208 290 641 
Alcohol 361 -40 -457 -561 -651 -875 
Agriculture 800 -50 -664 -868 -1,041 -758 
Food -1,108 -280 -1,442 -1,622 -2,242 -1,090 
Macro total -94,610 1,111 947 43 4,156 34,179 






Income (2005 prices) Utility Food utility Non-food utility 
1. €499 a month or less -28 -11 -31 
2. €500 to €999 a month -24 -8 -27 
3. €1.000 to €1.499 a month -21 -7 -24 
4. €1.500 to €1.999 a month -20 -6 -22 
5. €2.000 to €2.499 a month -18 -5 -20 
6. €2.500 to €2.999 a month -17 -4 -19 
7. €3.000 to €4.999 a month -15 -3 -16 
8. €5.000 a month or more -12 -1 -13 
Aggregate household -19 -5 -22 
Table 8: Cumulative Impact on Poor/Rich Households by 2015. 
 (% change relative to baseline) 
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